Iraq has pervasively dominated headlines for quite some time. With all the daunting challenges we face in Iraq and the weighty consequences of failure, it is not surprising that the U.S. has been fixated on that enormous endeavor. But, we cannot leave Afghanistan out in the cold. It was Afghanistan, more than Iraq, that bred, cultivated and funded terror. Afghanistan's mountains still harbor Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan's people remain under our care while the fledgling democracy struggles against Afghan warlords and Taliban remnants. Rebuilding Afghanistan is a crucial part of proving the sincerity of America's ideals to the world. Failure in Afghanistan will also have ominous implications for our efforts towards democracy in Iraq.

A report released this week by the General Accounting Office (GAO) gives a thorough account of what has gone wrong and what has gone right in Afghanistan's reconstruction. Although the report contains many positives, the primary implication is that the federal government has let its attention wander, to the detriment of Afghanistan's people. Security concerns have grown more urgent and delayed funding has set back major reconstruction programs.

The report found that long-term reconstruction efforts were achieving “limited results.” The reasons for this slow progress include the mundane: a lack of funds and associated delays in contracting; and the deadly: deteriorating security and increased violence from enemies of the nascent democracy. Most of our success came early in the reconstruction effort, thanks to the considerable amount of money that we committed to short-term humanitarian assistance.

Of nearly $1.4 billion appropriated for assistance to Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003, only $900 million has been spent. Of that, 75% was for short-term humanitarian aid, leaving little for the much more costly and wide scale business of rebuilding. More than $500 million obligated for long-term reconstruction remains unspent because of inadequate USAID staff in Afghanistan, security concerns, and the timing of incoming funding.

This year's funding for Afghanistan came partially from the supplemental spending bill and partially from a redirection of existing funds. Much of the agency's 2002 funds were used for emergency measures in the winter, leaving them with drained accounts as they entered 2003. As a result, only two of seven major reconstruction contracts began on time. Many national services, such as telecommunications, remain spotty and more sophisticated infrastructure replacement has not even begun. These problems are seriously impacting efforts to rebuild Afghanistan, but more serious still is the ongoing violence that threatens to derail democracy and reconstruction.

America's visceral images of war have been coming from Iraq, but violence in Afghanistan persists. Coalition forces continue to skirmish with al Qaeda and the Taliban. Three assassination attempts have resulted in the murder of the Vice President, and failed attempts on the Minister of Defense and President Karzai. Warlords continue to preside over large regions of land and battle amongst themselves for control of narcotics trafficking. An international Red Cross worker was murdered and nine contractors died while rebuilding the Kabul-Kandahar road. And, rocket attacks, sniper fire, and bombings are frequent, seriously hindering our efforts to repair infrastructure and ensure safety to the public.

In February of 2003, President Karzai entreated the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Don't forget us if Iraq happens,” and reminded them that “Afghanistan has been destroyed… a lot more needs to be done for a consistent period of time, in a systematic, sustained way.” Much of our success in Afghanistan has hinged on the effectiveness of our short-term humanitarian aid and the financial largesse of other countries in the coalition, who collectively have provided 62% of the total aid to Afghanistan. Unfortunately, this has not translated into long-term success. Getting back on track will require a recommitment from the U.S. to a stable, democratic Afghanistan. Such a commitment will demonstrate the veracity of our moral rhetoric to international skeptics and bring more credibility to our efforts in Iraq.