Regardless of where you fall on what should be in the Congressional budget resolution – less funding, more funding, entitlement reform, fixes to mandatory programs – it is clear to all that the budget process is broken. There are too many years where not only is there no final budget agreement, but one chamber doesn’t even vote on a budget. Without specifics, one or both chamber just “deems” a certain level of spending to be the right amount and the spending committees get to divvying up the funds to pay for government.

It’s useful to understand how we got here. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is the basis for the existing process. It came at a time where there was growing frustration in Congress that the Executive Branch had too much control over the process and the information for budgeting. Indeed the full name of the legislation is the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 because Title X was designed to stop President Nixon from impounding – withholding – funds for projects and programs Congress had authorized. Because of that provision, the President can ask Congress for a rescission of funds for this or that, but unless lawmakers in both Chamber approve, the money gets spent. Congress basically ignores rescission requests. But we digress. Title II created the Congressional Budget Office, an invaluable tool for lawmakers and the public to get budgetary information. CBO is probably the greatest legacy of the 1974 legislation. Title III created the annual budget process.

As envisioned, each Chamber would draft their own budget resolution that established hard discretionary spending levels and recommendations to other committees about how much to cut from mandatory programs, and sometimes, where. The “how much” recommendations become directions under a subsequent process known as budget reconciliation but the committees can still determine the “where” unless they fail to actually make cuts. There have been subsequent changes to modify the process, create rules, specify what can or cannot be part of the discussion, but it is largely the same.

But, like nearly everything else in Washington, it isn’t working.

The budget resolution is a political document of the majority. The minority never votes for it. It also is just a housekeeping measure for Congress. It gets both the House and the Senate on the same page for spending levels, but doesn’t even go to the President to become law. (If there is a subsequent reconciliation package with actual changes/cuts, it has to go to the President for approval, but as mentioned above, it is not a regular occurrence.) This is why it is concerning that both parties are having trouble moving budget resolutions. Senate Democrats didn’t even bring one up for a floor vote four of the last five years when they were in the majority, apparently over concerns of political ramifications. Today, it appears that the largest House Republican majority since 1930 may not be able to approve a budget. This is due in part because the Freedom Caucus wants to adopt a budget that cuts non-defense discretionary spending below the levels agreed to in last fall’s Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) legislation. This ignores the fact that the Budget Resolution only sets the aggregate discretionary funding level, which includes both defense and non-defense. Of course the move would reduce that top line (not that we mind) but many Republicans would rather spend that cash, whether on defense or elsewhere. Speaker Ryan can’t count on the vote of a single Democrat, so they can only lose 29 Republicans before an embarrassing rejection.

A popular purported solution, biennial budgeting, wouldn’t have much of an impact. The argument that passing a budget one year and conducting oversight the next is attractive (and not one we oppose) but the fact is a de facto budget in the BBA was adopted months ago and is being re-litigated. Besides, like college students and a term paper Congress will take up all the time allotted before the deadline.

A thorough review has to be undertaken. The Budget Committees should be strengthened. In 1974, some of the barons who ran the House Committees had been in power for decades. They were loath to give up authority to some new Committee. When you step back, it becomes abundantly clear that the Budget Committee should be strengthened with representation from other Committee leadership and empowered to set binding directions on other Committees. The President should have to approve the budget like any other law. Counter-intuitively raising the stakes for the budget process and making it more consequential may actually make it more likely for the legislation to be taken seriously and adopted.